I don't see why we need to stand by and watch a country go Communist due to the irresponsibility of its own people.
social scientists, historians, linguists and even literary crit ics-were instructed to study friends and enemies, real and potential, present and future. OSS researchers began to tum their attention to the Soviet Union well before the war was over, though, as Winks notes, some of the leftish aca demics performed this new task with a decided lack of enthusiasm.
Because of its tweedy aura, R&A was usually called the campus-a name that stuck to its organizational offspring, the CIA, and to the Agency's headquarters in Langley, Virginia. Winks's chapter on R&A focuses on three scholar/ spooks-William Langer, the Harvard historian; Wilmarth Lewis, the Yale bibliophile of independent means whose lifework was a forty-eight-volume edition of the papers of Horace Walpole; and Sherman Kent, a Yale historian. By the end of the war, R&A had gathered 3 million index cards, 300,000 photographs, a million maps, 350,000 foreign serials, 50,000 books, thousands of loose postcards-all in dexed and cross-indexed under the direction of Lewis, who loved the apparatus of scholarship. (Many of these docu ments were gathered under the cover of the Yale library.) 'Nothing is better reading (except a good index) than footnotes," said Lewis, which helps explain the triumph of form over substance that is the Yale Walpole.
So what? asks Winks-what did R&A contribute to the war? They refined estimates of German annaments pro duction, contributed to the planning for the invasion of North Africa and evaluated potential bombing targets. But, as Winks concedes, the work of R&A was romanticized by those, led by Donovan, who hoped to keep the OSS alive after the war over the objections of those who felt-not irrationally-that a peacetime intelligence agency was an affront to American democracy.
R&A lives on in the interdisciplinary area studies depart ments in American universities. In 1964, McGeorge Bundy, president of the Ford Foundation, which encouraged the development of these departments, said: "In very large measure the area study programs developed in American universities in the years after the war were manned, di rected, or stimulated by graduates of the OSS-a remark able institution, half cops-and-robbers and half faculty meeting." Thus began the transformation of the universi [ 
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GRAND STREET ties into regional offices of the American Imperium's exec utive committee. R &A lends a tweedy image to spycraft, but it makes for rather dull reading. The real star of Cloak and Gown is James Jesus Angleton, Yale '41. Intelligence ran in Angleton's blood; his father, James Hugh Angleton, headed the National Cash Register franchise in Italy; in the course of visiting NCR's European operations, he set up his own amateur spy operation, which was of benefit to the United States when the war broke out. Angleton pere was a Mason, and a professed admirer of Italy and Ger many in the 1930s.
Angleton fil plunged into the literary life at Yale; he ed ited three student magazines, most notably Furioso, which he published with his roommate, Reed Whittemore. For a student journal, it featured a very tony cast of characters, including Williams, Stevens, Pound, cummings, and Emp son. Classmates described Angleton as <'a fanatic in the making," "a mysterious Satan," living a sly life of "mys terious guile." As Whittemore said, Angleton began his undercover work early: he delivered copies of Furioso in the dead of night, dropping them outside of subscribers' doors.
Angleton joined the counterintelligence (CI) branch of OSS, X-2, which was headed by another Yalie, Norman Holmes Pearson. While with X-2, Pearson supervised the accumulation of files on a million enemy agents and or ganizations, a practice Pearson strongly felt should be con tinued after the war, despite its offensiveness to traditional Jeffersonian notions of government. Such quaint objec tions, as we know, were quickly overcome, as the term "enemy" acquired a very liberal definition.
X-2 also handled the Ultra intelligence, spycraffs great est coup, which was kept secret for thirty years after the war. The British, with Polish assistance, had cracked the German codes and were eavesdropping on communications the Germans thought secret. Intelligence partisans think Ultra was crucial to the war effort. Maybe. Advertising its importance is a nice way for paper-pushers to upstage GI Joe and Rosie the Riveter, who also had something to do But it was these public citizens educated in civic virtue who recruited Nazis, manipulated the Italian elections, fed LSD to the unwitting, opened our mail and overthrew the governments of Iran and Guatemala-all in the Golden Age. 
